Articles Posted in Sexual Harassment

In 1994, the California legislature enacted Civil Code section 51.9 to address the relationship between providers of professional services and their clients. The statute sets out a non-exclusive list of such providers, which includes physicians, psychiatrists, dentists, attorneys, real estate agents, accountants, bankers, building contractors, executors, trustees, landlords, and teacher; also falling within the statute’s reach is sexual harassment in any relationship that is substantially similar to the ones specifically listed. Thus, for instance, a certified nursing assistant’s relationship with a patient is either a service or professional relationship with that patient, and would support statutory liability for sexual harassment within this section within a “business, service, or professional” relationship.

Under Cal. Civ. Code section 51.9, the victim must establish not only that a qualifying “relationship” exists, but also that the relationship is one that the claimant cannot easily terminate. The claimant must also show both that the harasser made sexual advances, solicitations, sexual requests, demands for sexual compliance, or engaged in other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based on gender, that were unwelcome and pervasive or severe. The standard for determining whether the conduct is severe and pervasive is similar to the one applicable to the sexual harassment at California workplace.

Under California law, to be actionable/unlawful the harassment at workplace must be sufficiently “severe and pervasive.” This means that, generally isolated comments and incidents, unless egregious, do not rise to the level of sexual harassment as defined by FEHA (California Fair Employment and Housing Act). But, what about staring? Can staring be grounds for a sexual harassment claim? On one hand, staring might be a very subjective complaints, as some people might think that someone is staring at them when in fact no one does. On the other hand, overt staring might be very threatening and indicate a kind of obsession and other threatening behavior.

The California Court of Appeal confronted the issue of whether staring can be considered sexual harassment in Birschtein v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (2001). In that case, a forklift driver approached the female assembly worker and asked her out several times. After she refused his propositions, he started sharing his explicit sexual fantasies about her, and drive around and look for her when she was not around. After the claimant complaint about harassment to the management, the forklift driver stopped speaking to her and never spoke to her again. Instead, he began staring at her. He would drive to her work station five or more times per day and stare directly at her for at least several second each time. He would also sit behind the forklift and stare at the plaintiff for five to ten minutes at a time.

When the female employee sued her employer for sexual harassment and failure to prevent harassment, one of the arguments that the defense attorneys had was that staring is not a sufficiently severe and pervasive behavior to constitute harassment as a matter of law. The court disagreed. In its holding, the court suggested that staring is particularly likely to be actionable as harassment if there is a prior history of prior acts between the harasser and the victim of harassment that would cause the victim to feel threatened and intimidated when the harasser, who engaged in the more overt acts of harassment, engages in staring in retaliation for the victim’s complaints. In other words, the court seemed to suggest that while staring alone might not be sufficient to constitute harassment, when combined with other (prior acts) by the same harasser, it may be sufficiently severe and pervasive to constitute sexual harassment.

There are various, although equally despicable and unlawful kinds of sexual harassment that employees may be subjected to at workplace. One type of sexual harassment may take the form of an economic “quid quo pro” where a supervisor’s requests for sexual favors are linked to the grant or denial of job benefits, such as getting or retaining a job, a receiving a favorable performance review, salary raise, promotion, bonus, etc. The typical case involves some for of sexual advance or proposition by a supervisor with an express or implied threat that if the employee refuses, he or she will be terminated or demoted, or lose other job-related benefits; or, the employee may be promised better treatment, such as a promotion, transfer, raise or favorable recommendation, if the employee submits to the sexual advances.

The supervisor’s requests for sexual favors in exchange for a certain benefit do not have to be express to constitute unlawful sexual harassment. It is enough that the individual making the unwelcome sexual advance was the victim’s supervisor, and that a link to employment benefits could be inferred under the circumstances. Such circumstances might include implied statements or simple the fact that the supervisor persists with demands for sexual favors after plaintiff has declined or stated that he or she is not interested in any kind of sexual interaction with the supervisor.

Thus, in one case a female employee was asked to lunch by her supervisor for the sole and express purpose of discussing his upcoming evaluation of her work and possible recommendation of her for a promotion. He allegedly told her that he continued success and employment at the company were dependent upon her agreeing to his sexual demands. His demand amounted to an additional “condition of employment” imposed upon her because of her gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Tomkins v. Public Service Elc. & Gas Co. (1977)

Physical violence at workplace is more common than we would like to believe. Recently, a client approached me describing the outrageous conduct of his former employer – while being notified of his termination, his employer, during a mild verbal confrontation violently pushed him against a furniture store in his office, which resulted in severe leg and back injury to the terminated employee and disability. That was a classic case of battery at workplace.

Battery requires a showing that (a) the victim was touched with an intent to harm or offend victim; (b) the victim did not consent to be touched; and (c) the victim was harmed or offended by the conduct in question. Even a touching that doesn’t inflict physical pain would be considered “offensive” if it would have offended a reasonable person’s sense of personal dignity. Act of sexual harassment which involve touching may also be actionable as battery, assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the employer is vicariously liable for torts committed by one employee upon another if those acts occurred during the “course and scope of employment” (or later ratified by the employer. In those cases, the basic question is whether the employee’s conduct “may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken by the employer. The logic behind holding responsible for the acts of violence at workplace is that losses fairly attributable to an enterprise – those which foreseeably result from the conduct of the enterprise – are allocated to the employer as a cost of doing business.